With the rapid increase in usage and popularity of the public Internet, the growth of electronic Internet-based trading of securities has been dramatic. In the first part of 1999, online trading via the Internet was estimated to make up approximately 15% of all stock trades. This volume has been growing at an annual rate of approximately 50%. High growth rates are projected to continue for the next few years, as increasing volumes of Internet users use online trading accounts.
Online trading firms such as E-Trade Group, Charles Schwab, and Ameritrade have all experienced significant growth in revenues due to increases in online trading activity. These companies currently offer Internet-based stock trading services, which provide greater convenience and lower commission rates for many retail investors, compared to traditional securities brokerage services. Many expect online trading to expand to financial products other than equities, such as bonds, foreign exchange, and financial instrument derivatives.
Financial products such as stocks, bonds, foreign exchange contracts, exchange traded futures and options, as well as contractual assets or liabilities such as reinsurance contracts or interest-rate swaps, all involve some measure of risk. The risks inherent in such products are a function of many factors, including the uncertainty of events, such as the Federal Reserve's determination to increase the discount rate, a sudden increase in commodity prices, the change in value of an underlying index such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average, or an overall increase in investor risk aversion. In order to better analyze the nature of such risks, financial economists often treat the real-world financial products as if they were combinations of simpler, hypothetical financial products. These hypothetical financial products typically are designed to pay one unit of currency, say one dollar, to the trader or investor if a particular outcome among a set of possible outcomes occurs. Possible outcomes may be said to fall within “states,” which are typically constructed from a distribution of possible outcomes (e.g., the magnitude of the change in the Federal Reserve discount rate) owing to some real-world event (e.g., a decision of the Federal Reserve regarding the discount rate). In such hypothetical financial products, a set of states is typically chosen so that the states are mutually exclusive and the set collectively covers or exhausts all possible outcomes for the event. This arrangement entails that, by design, exactly one state always occurs based on the event outcome.
These hypothetical financial products (also known as Arrow-Debreu securities, state securities, or pure securities) are designed to isolate and break-down complex risks into distinct sources, namely, the risk that a distinct state will occur. Such hypothetical financial products are useful since the returns from more complicated securities, including real-world financial products, can be modeled as a linear combination of the returns of the hypothetical financial products. See, e.g., R. Merton, Continuous-Time Finance (1990), pp. 441 ff. Thus, such hypothetical financial products are frequently used today to provide the fundamental building blocks for analyzing more complex financial products.
In the past fifteen years, the growth in derivatives trading has also been enormous. According to the Federal Reserve, the annualized growth rate in foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives turnover alone is still running at about 20%. Corporations, financial institutions, farmers, and even national governments and agencies are all active in the derivatives markets, typically to better manage asset and liability portfolios, hedge financial market risk, and minimize costs of capital funding. Money managers also frequently use derivatives to hedge and undertake economic exposure where there are inherent risks, such as risks of fluctuation in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, convertibility into other securities or outstanding purchase offers for cash or exchange offers for cash or securities.
Derivatives are traded on exchanges, such as the option and futures contracts traded on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), as well as off-exchange or over-the-counter (OTC) between two or more derivative counterparties. On the major exchanges which operate trading activity in derivatives, orders are typically either transmitted electronically or via open outcry in pits to member brokers who then execute the orders. These member brokers then usually balance or hedge their own portfolio of derivatives to suit their own risk and return criteria. Hedging is customarily accomplished by trading in the derivatives' underlying securities or contracts (e.g., a futures contract in the case of an option on that future) or in similar derivatives (e.g., futures expiring in different calendar months). For OTC derivatives, brokers or dealers customarily seek to balance their active portfolios of derivatives in accordance with the trader's risk management guidelines and profitability criteria.
Broadly speaking then, there are two widely utilized means by which derivatives are currently traded: (1) order-matching and (2) principal market making. Order matching is a model followed by exchanges such as the CBOT or the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and some newer online exchanges. In order matching, the exchange coordinates the activities of buyers and sellers so that “bids” to buy (i.e., demand) can be paired off with “offers” to sell (i.e., supply). Orders may be matched both electronically and through the primary market making activities of the exchange members. Typically, the exchange itself takes no market risk and covers its own cost of operation by selling memberships to brokers. Member brokers may take principal positions, which are often hedged across their portfolios.
In principal market making, a bank or brokerage firm, for example, establishes a derivatives trading operation, capitalizes it, and makes a market by maintaining a portfolio of derivatives and underlying positions. The market maker usually hedges the portfolio on a dynamic basis by continually changing the composition of the portfolio as market conditions change. In general, the market maker strives to cover its cost of operation by collecting a bid-offer spread and through the scale economies obtained by simultaneously hedging a portfolio of positions. As the market maker takes significant market risk, its counterparties are exposed to the risk that it may go bankrupt. Additionally, while in theory the principal market making activity could be done over a wide area network, in practice derivatives trading is today usually accomplished via the telephone. Often, trades are processed laboriously, with many manual steps required from the front office transaction to the back office processing and clearing.
In theory—that is, ignoring very real transaction costs (described below)—derivatives trading is, in the language of game theory, a “zero sum” game. One counterparty's gain on a transaction should be exactly offset by the corresponding counterparty's loss, assuming there are no transaction costs. In fact, it is the zero sum nature of the derivatives market which first allowed the well-known Black-Scholes pricing model to be formulated by noting that a derivative such as an option could be paired with an exactly offsetting position in the underlying security so as to eliminate market risk over short periods of time. It is this “no arbitrage” feature, which allows market participants, using sophisticated valuation models, to mitigate market risk by continually adjusting their portfolios. Stock markets, by contrast, do not have this zero sum feature, as the total stock or value of the market fluctuates due to factors such as interest rates and expected corporate earnings, which are “external” to the market in the sense that they cannot readily be hedged.
The return to a trader of a traditional derivative product is, in most cases, largely determined by the value of the underlying security, asset, liability or claim on which the derivative is based. For example, the value of a call option on a stock, which gives the holder the right to buy the stock at some future date at a fixed strike price, varies directly with the price of the underlying stock. In the case of non-financial derivatives such as reinsurance contracts, the value of the reinsurance contract is affected by the loss experience on the underlying portfolio of insured claims. The prices of traditional derivative products are usually determined by supply and demand for the derivative based on the value of the underlying security (which is itself usually determined by supply and demand, or, as in the case of insurance, by events insured by the insurance or reinsurance contract).
Currently, the costs of trading derivative securities (both on and off the exchanges) and transferring insurance risk are considered to be high for a number of reasons, including:                (1) Credit Risk: A counterparty to a derivatives (or insurance contract) transaction typically assumes the risk that its counterparty will go bankrupt during the life of the derivatives (or insurance) contract. Margin requirements, credit monitoring, and other contractual devices, which may be costly, are customarily employed to manage derivatives and insurance counterparty credit risk.        (2) Regulatory Requirements: Regulatory bodies, such as the Federal Reserve, Comptroller of the Currency, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, and international bodies that promulgate regulations affecting global money center banks (e.g., Basle Committee guidelines) generally require institutions dealing in derivatives to meet capital requirements and maintain risk management systems. These requirements are considered by many to increase the cost of capital and barriers to entry for some entrants into the derivatives trading business, and thus to increase the cost of derivatives transactions for both dealers and end users. In the United States, state insurance regulations also impose requirements on the operations of insurers, especially in the property-casualty lines where capital demands may be increased by the requirement that insurers reserve for future losses without regard to interest rate discount factors.        (3) Liquidity: Derivatives traders typically hedge their exposures throughout the life of the derivatives contract. Effective hedging usually requires that an active or liquid market exist, throughout the life of the derivative contract, for both the underlying security and the derivative. Frequently, especially in periods of financial market shocks and disequilibria, liquid markets do not exist to support a well-functioning derivatives market.        
(4) Transaction Costs: Dynamic hedging of derivatives often requires continual transactions in the market over the life of the derivative in order to reduce, eliminate, and manage risk for a derivative or portfolio of derivative securities. This usually means paying bid-offers spreads for each hedging transaction, which can add significantly to the price of the derivative security at inception compared to its theoretical price in absence of the need to pay for such spreads and similar transaction costs.                (5) Settlement and Clearing Costs: The costs of executing, electronically booking, clearing, and settling derivatives transactions can be large, sometimes requiring analytical and database software systems and personnel knowledgeable in such transactions. While a goal of many in the securities processing industry is to achieve “straight-through-processing” of derivatives transactions, many derivatives counterparties continue to manage the processing of these transactions using a combination of electronic and manual steps which are not particularly integrated or automated and therefore add to costs.        
(6) Event Risk: Most traders understand effective hedging of derivatives transactions to require markets to be liquid and to exhibit continuously fluctuating prices without sudden and dramatic “gaps.” During periods of financial crises and disequilibria, it is not uncommon to observe dramatic repricing of underlying securities by 50% or more in a period of hours. The event risk of such crises and disequilibria are therefore customarily factored into derivatives prices by dealers, which increases the cost of derivatives in excess of the theoretical prices indicated by derivatives valuation models. These costs are usually spread across all derivatives users.
(7) Model Risk: Derivatives contracts can be quite difficult to value, especially those involving interest rates or features which allow a counterparty to make decisions throughout the life of the derivative (e.g., American options allow a counterparty to realize the value of the derivative at any time during its life). Derivatives dealers will typically add a premium to derivatives prices to insure against the possibility that the valuation models may not adequately reflect market factors or other conditions throughout the life of the contract. In addition, risk management guidelines may require firms to maintain additional capital supporting a derivatives dealing operation where model risk is determined to be a significant factor. Model risk has also been a large factor in well-known cases where complicated securities risk management systems have provided incorrect or incomplete information, such as the Joe Jett/Kidder Peabody losses of 1994.                (8) Asymmetric Information: Derivatives dealers and market makers customarily seek to protect themselves from counterparties with superior information. Bid-offer spreads for derivatives therefore usually reflect a built-in insurance premium for the dealer for transactions with counterparties with superior information, which can lead to unprofitable transactions. Traditional insurance markets also incur costs due to asymmetric information. In property-casualty lines, the direct writer of the insurance almost always has superior information regarding the book of risks than does the assuming reinsurer. Much like the market maker in capital markets, the reinsurer typically prices its informational disadvantage into the reinsurance premiums.        
(9) Incomplete Markets: Traditional capital and insurance markets are often viewed as incomplete in the sense that the span of contingent claims is limited, i.e., the markets may not provide opportunities to hedge all of the risks for which hedging opportunities are sought. As a consequence, participants typically either bear risk inefficiently or use less than optimal means to transfer or hedge against risk. For example, the demand by some investors to hedge inflation risk has resulted in the issuance by some governments of inflation-linked bonds which have coupons and principal amounts linked to Consumer Price Index (CPI) levels. This provides a degree of insurance against inflation risk. However, holders of such bonds frequently make assumptions as to the future relationship between real and nominal interest rates. An imperfect correlation between the contingent claim (in this case, inflation-linked bond) and the contingent event (inflation) gives rise to what traders call “basis risk,” which is risk that, in today's markets, cannot be perfectly insured or hedged.
Currently, transaction costs are also considerable in traditional insurance and reinsurance markets. In recent years, considerable effort has been expended in attempting to securitize insurance risk such as property-casualty catastrophe risk. Traditional insurance and reinsurance markets in many respects resemble principal market-maker securities markets and suffer from many of the same shortcomings and incur similar costs of operation. Typically, risk is physically transferred contractually, credit status of counterparties is monitored, and sophisticated risk management systems are deployed and maintained. Capitalization levels to support insurance portfolios of risky assets and liabilities may be dramatically out of equilibrium at any given time due to price stickiness, informational asymmetries and costs, and regulatory constraints. In short, the insurance and reinsurance markets tend to operate according to the same market mechanisms that have prevailed for decades, despite large market shocks such as the Lloyds crisis in the late 1980's and early 1990's.
Accordingly, a driving force behind all the contributors to the costs of derivatives and insurance contracts is the necessity or desirability of risk management through dynamic hedging or contingent claim replication in continuous, liquid, and informationally fair markets. Hedging is used by derivatives dealers to reduce their exposure to excessive market risk while making transaction fees to cover their cost of capital and ongoing operations; and effective hedging requires liquidity.
Recent patents have addressed the problem of financial market liquidity in the context of an electronic order-matching systems (e.g., U.S. Pat. No. 5,845,266). The principal techniques disclosed to enhance liquidity are to increase participation and traded volume in the system and to solicit trader preferences about combinations of price and quantity for a particular trade of a security. There are shortcomings to these techniques, however. First, these techniques implement order-matching and limit order book algorithms, which can be and are effectively employed in traditional “brick and mortar” exchanges. Their electronic implementation, however, primarily serves to save on transportation and telecommunication charges. No fundamental change is contemplated to market structure for which an electronic network may be essential. Second, the disclosed techniques appear to enhance liquidity at the expense of placing large informational burdens on the traders (by soliciting preferences, for example, over an entire price-quantity demand curve) and by introducing uncertainty as to the exact price at which a trade has been transacted or is “filled.” Finally, these electronic order matching systems contemplate a traditional counterparty pairing, which means physical securities are frequently transferred, cleared, and settled after the counterparties are identified and matched. In other words, techniques disclosed in the context of electronic order-matching systems are technical elaborations to the basic problem of how to optimize the process of matching arrays of bids and offers.
Patents relating to derivatives, such as U.S. Pat. No. 4,903,201, disclose an electronic adaptation of current open-outcry or order matching exchanges for the trading of futures is disclosed. Another recent patent, U.S. Pat. No. 5,806,048, relates to the creation of open-end mutual fund derivative securities to provide enhanced liquidity and improved availability of information affecting pricing. This patent, however, does not contemplate an electronic derivatives exchange which requires the traditional hedging or replicating portfolio approach to synthesizing the financial derivatives. Similarly, U.S. Pat. No. 5,794,207 proposes an electronic means of matching buyers' bids and sellers' offers, without explaining the nature of the economic price equilibria achieved through such a market process.